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ARTICLES
Motions to Enforce Settlements: An
Important Procedural Tool
DAVID F. HERR*
ROGER S. HAYDOCK**
JEFFREY W. STEMPEL***
It is widely accepted that over 90 percent of today's litigation
terminates in settlement. Most often the parties, satisfied if not
enthralled with their bargain, fulfill the terms of the settlement
and retreat from the battle to their tents, carrying on their
lives. Occasionally, one party fails to fulfill part of the bargain.
Breakdowns in settlement are comparatively rare, but do occur.
One party may belatedly recognize a bad bargain, and balk at
consummating the settlement. Another party may be unable to
comply with agreed upon settlement terms because of lack of
money. Occasionally, outside circumstances may change after the
settlement is reached, adversely affecting the value or cost of
settlement for a party. For example, the 3,000 shares of XYZ
Oil Co. stock accepted in settlement plummet in value upon
expropriation of the company's Persian Gulf assets. Sometimes,
the breaching party is simply unscrupulous.
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Three available remedies are:
1. Amendment or supplementation of the pleadings to
allege the settlement agreement as an executory accord;
2. Initiation of a separate action for breach of the
settlement agreement; and
3. A motion to enforce settlement.
The third remedy is the most common and is usually the most
cost-effective. Amending the pleadings and commencing a sepa-
rate action both require significant delay, and require the parties
to expend additional resources. A motion to enforce the settle-
ment may be an effective tool to accomplish the intended result
of the settlement agreement.
Judges frequently show greater disdain for motions to enforce
settlement than for other types of motions. In reviewing the
enforceability of a written settlement agreement, the judge may
have to find or imply that one party is dishonest. In reviewing
oral settlement agreements between counsel, a judge may have
to determine whether an attorney was authorized by the client
to settle, whether an attorney properly represented and coun-
seled a client, whether an attorney exceeded the authorization
of the client, or whether one party deceived the other party or
has attempted to deceive the court. Despite the unpleasantness
of airing a breach of settlement, the court will probably be
favorably disposed to the party who can establish that a settle-
ment occurred and was breached. Consequently, the reported
cases enforce settlement far more often than they find an absence
of settlement. One surmises that the judicial pain of implying
dishonesty of a party or ultra vires action by counsel is out-
weighed by the joy of removing a case from the docket.
Jurisdiction
A motion to enforce settlement should be made before the
court which had jurisdiction over the original claim. Amendment
of the pleadings to seek enforcement of a settlement is unnec-
essary and superfluous because a motion will accomplish the
same result. The commencement of a new action may only be
necessary in a situation in which the original court no longer
has personal or subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying
action and settlement. The new action would begin with a short
complaint alleging the existence of the settlement agreement
and a cause of action for breach. The requested relief may be
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either specific performance or reinstatement of the original claim.
The latter would subsequently require reinitiating the original
claim in the new forum if the complaint for breach of settlement
is granted. The movant's best tactic will be a simple motion to
enforce directed to the original judge, a judge who thought the
case had settled some time ago. This judge, who may have even
entered an order of dismissal because of the settlement and
instructed the calendar clerk to close the file, will want to
resolve the matter expeditiously. The original court also knows
the procedural background of the case, and may even have been
involved in the settlement discussions upon which the settlement
was based.
Motion to Vacate
Because the court may have entered an order dismissing the
case or placing it in the inactive file, the movant seeking to
enforce settlement may first need to make a motion to vacate
the earlier action, which removed the case from the calendar,
and to reinstate the action. This can be accomplished either
through a short motion filed in advance of the motion to enforce
or in a request for reinstatement made as part of the underlying
motion to enforce. Where the movant makes a separate and
preceding motion to vacate and reinstate, the movant should file
a notice of motion, motion, proposed order, memorandum and
affidavit setting forth the facts which justify reinstatement.'
Because the same supporting documents will be required for a
motion to enforce settlement and because even the contents of
the documents will be identical in part, it is easier and probably
a better practice to submit a combined motion to reinstate and
enforce settlement. If this is done, a single notice of motion or mo-
tions, affidavit or affidavits and memorandum need be filed.
It is probably desirable to submit separate proposed orders even
if a combined motion is filed. One advantage of specifically
seeking both reinstatement of the action and enforcement of the
settlement is the flexibility it allows the court. In the event that
the court denies the motion to enforce, the movant will none-
theless want to reopen the original action as soon as possible
to avoid problems with the statute of limitations, res judicata,
1. A detailed discussion of these procedural requirements is beyond the
scope of this article. Generally, however, the formal requirements of a motion
are contained in FED. R. Civ. P. 7, 10 and 11. In addition to the requirements
of the rules of civil procedure, many district courts have adopted local rules
which create more stringent requirements for motions.
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collateral estoppel and similar doctrines. A separate proposed
order or reinstatement makes this possible.
Often, an order dismissing the action or placing it in the
"suspense" file will be entered upon the court's learning of the
settlement. These orders are routinely entered by some judges
without the request of the parties, or even despite requests that
they not be entered. Such an order will normally specifically
reserve to the court the possibility of reopening the matter if
the settlement is not achieved or if other good cause is shown.
If the order mentions the possible vacation of dismissal or
suspense and of reinstatement, it should not be difficult to
establish entitlement to relief if the settlement is breached. The
memorandum supporting reinstatement in this case may be terse,
and the factual support in the affidavits may be brief.
If the order dismissing the action or placing it in the suspense
file is silent about reinstatement, some discussion about the
court's inherent power to reopen the matter on the basis of its
inherent authority, the authority granted by Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b), and the interests of justice is in order. Failure to comply
with the terms of a settlement agreement constitutes misconduct
of an adverse party within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(3).2 That rule permits the court to relieve a party of the
effect of an order or judgment upon a showing of fraud, mis-
representation or other misconduct. It would appear that the
breach of settlement also qualifies as "any other reason justifying
relief' from the order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).3 By its
terms, Rule 60(b) applies only where a party seeks relief from
a judgment or final order. Depending upon the wording of the
order in question, the movant seeking to enforce settlement may
be able to argue that the order of dismissal or suspense is not
final within the meaning of Rule 60, especially where the order
was conditioned upon a settlement that has not been performed.
Rule 60 applies only to final orders because of the court's clear
authority to change, modify, reverse or vacate any interlocutory
order. In the case of an interlocutory order, no further authority
from the rules is required.
Enforcement Procedure
The motion to enforce, whether alone or in combination with
a motion to reopen, should contain the usual package of motion
2. 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE S 2860
(1970) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER].
3. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, at S 2864.
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papers -notice, motion, memorandum in support, proposed order
and supporting affidavit or affidavits. Depending upon the juris-
diction, the proposed order may be unnecessary. Some judges
may frown on submission of proposed orders because it seems
presumptuous. Accordingly, it is important to determine the local
practice and custom before submitting proposed orders. While
courts will not literally "weigh" the evidence of settlement on
a scale, the movant should try to include the affidavits of the
party and any individuals negotiating or witnessing the settle-
ment. Other corroborating evidence by affidavit, in reasonable
number, is also helpful. In determining whether settlement exists,
the court will usually have to weigh evidence of credibility.
Proper and complete use of affidavits will discourage the opposing
party from denying the obvious or fabricating an explanation.
Where the affidavits can eliminate factual disputes, the hearing
on the motion is less likely to produce conflicting oral testimony
and is more likely to produce enforcement of the settlement
according to its true terms.
The movant should normally schedule a hearing on the motion
to enforce. Preferably, the movant obtains the hearing date and
time from the court prior to serving the motion. Where the
court does not regularly conduct a motion day, the court may
be reluctant to schedule a hearing prior to service and filing of
the motion. In that event, the movant should press for a hearing
immediately after the motion is made.
At the hearing, the movant should arrive with the witnesses
and exhibits necessary to prove the case if the motion is con-
tested. In effect, the hearing on the motion is a mini-trial on a
breach of contract claim, the contract being the settlement
agreement. In some instances it will be obvious that the opposing
party has few or no factual contentions in opposition to the
enforcement motion. In these situations, the opposing party will
either interpose a legal argument based on the relatively un-
contested facts (e.g., lack of actual or implied authority of counsel)
or will not contest the motion and will chalk one up to delay
and anticipated judgment dodging.
The prudent movant will view these situations on a sliding
scale. Where the facts are in hot dispute, the moving lawyer
should come to the enforcement hearing as if to a trial or hearing
on a motion for a preliminary injunction. This level of preparation
should be limited only by the constraints of the availability of
probative evidence. Where the facts at issue are relatively minor,
where the opposition to the motion is essentially legal, or where
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the delaying, breaching party is not likely to contest the motion
vigorously, the client's resources should be preserved. But, as
always, erring on the side of caution and over-preparation is
advisable.
Depending on the nature of the alleged settlement, either
affidavits, witnesses, documents or exhibits should accompany
the motion for enforcement. For example, where the settlement
provided that the opposing party would pay attorney's fees, at
least a portion of one affidavit should aver this fact and set
forth the amount of fees requested. The request for fees should
be explained, including dates, description of services rendered,
time expended and extension at a normal billing rate. The billing
rate should be established to be reasonable under the prevailing
standards of the legal community. This approach is consistent
with the "lodestar" approach to determining fees to be awarded
in actions under certain statutes and in class actions.4 Where
specific performance or a confession of judgment is part of the
settlement, these too should be set forth in the relief requested
in the motion and should be supported with affidavits and proof
at a hearing. If the successful movant expects the opposing party
to take irreparably harmful action to avoid an order enforcing
the settlement, the movant should request appropriate injunctive
relief and be prepared to prove the case for the injunction at
the main hearing.
The Law of Settlement
As previously noted, the law favors settlements.5 Settlement
promotes judicial economy, saving valuable court time as well
as avoiding delay for the parties, while removing the uncertainty
inherent in trial, particularly jury trial. Settlement also conserves
the resources of the parties, and therefore society, that would
otherwise be spent on court costs, legal fees and other expenses. 6
There is also a widely held view that settlements, being by
definition satisfactory to the parties, are more effective at re-
moving discord within our social and commercial fabric, and are,
4. See, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, __U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 76 L.
Ed. 2d 40 (1983) (outlining method for calculation of fees in civil rights class
actions).
v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation, 519 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 965 (1976).
6. See Autera v. Robinson, 419 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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therefore, more desirable from a societal view. Consequently,
the law of settlement has established relatively low barriers to
proving settlement.
In order to be enforceable, a settlement need not be in writing.7
To prove a settlement, a party must establish the elements of
an enforceable contract by showing the mutual assent of the
parties to the terms of the purported settlement, and the con-
sideration supporting it.8 The agreement can be oral and "infor-
mal."9 Once the moving party has established a settlement
agreement, the burden falls on the opposing party to prove facts
which would invalidate the settlement. Otherwise, the breaching
party is bound by the settlement."°
Although settlement is essentially a contract between the
parties and proof of the settlement resembles proof of contract
(e.g., offer, acceptance, consideration), most courts have held that
the proper contract law to be applied varies with the case. In
determining the applicable law in construing settlements, the
court will usually examine the underlying causes of action. Where
the underlying claim is federal or "implicates the operation of
a network of federal statutes," the court should apply the federal
common law of contracts. 1 Thus, federal law would apply to
settlements of disputed claims in civil rights, patent, trademark,
copyright and antitrust actions.' 2
Where the underlying cause of action is based on state law,
the court will apply the contract law of the state with the closest
nexus to the settlement.'" This will usually be the state whose
law would supply the rule of decision in the underlying cause
of action.'4 However, in certain cases, choice of law principles
would support the application of the law of a non-forum state.
7. See Green v. John H. Lewis & Co., 436 F.2d 389 (3d Cir. 1970); Bergstrom
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 532 F. Supp. 923, 932 (D. Minn. 1982).
8. See Russell v. United States, 320 F.2d 920 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
9. See Main Line Theatres, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 298
F.2d 801 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 939 (1962).
10. See Strange v. Gulf & S. Am. S.S. Co., 495 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1974).
11. See Bergstrom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 532 F. Supp. 923, 931 (D. Minn.
1982). See generally Note, Displacement of State Rules of Decision in Construing
Releases of Federal Claims, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 339 (1978).
12. See Fulgence v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 662 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir.
1981).
13. See Roberts v. Browning, 610 F.2d 528, 533 (8th Cir. 1979); Okono v.
Union Oil, 519 F. Supp. 372 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
14. Id.
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Usually, however, the forum state will be the location where
settlement is negotiated, reached and memorialized. In such cases,
forum state contract law should usually be applied even if it
would not have been applied to the original underlying claim.
A recent Fourth Circuit case, Gamewell Manufacturing, Inc.
v. HVAC Supply, Inc.,15 stated that federal courts should apply
a federal common law of contracts in construing settlement
disputes with respect to federal litigation already in progress
because such disputes "implicate federal procedural interests
distinct from the underlying substantive interests of the par-
ties."'16 The Fourth Circuit essentially views settlement law as
purely procedural and not within the substantive law arm of
the Erie doctrine.'7 Although this approach would presumably
be more consistent than other choice of law methods, the Ga-
mewell decision is a trailblazer, and it is not yet clear whether
it will be followed.
Showing breach of the settlement, once settlement has been
established, should be relatively straightforward. The major
controversy in a motion to enforce usually concerns the authority
of counsel (or some other agent of a party) to agree to the
settlement terms and bind the party. A party in breach of a
settlement seldom questions its terms, at least not if the settle-
ment terms have been memorialized in some writing. More
commonly, the party breaching the settlement argues that the
attorney made the agreement without the party's authority.
Usually that ultra vires agent is the attorney for the party, or
was formerly attorney for the party.
Most jurisdictions require that attorneys compromise and settle
claims only with the actual authority of their clients. 8 The Code
of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct mandate that an attorney obtain the approval of a client
before agreeing to a settlement.19 This authority may be express
because of the words of the party to counsel or implied because
of the actions of the party and counsel. 20 Apparent authority,
15. 715 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1983).
16. Id. at 115.
17. See Erie R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938).
18. See, e.g., Aetna Life & Casualty v. Anderson, 310 N.W.2d 91, 95 (Minn.
1981).
19. Compare ABA Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-7, EC 7-8 &
DR 7-101(A)(3) with ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.2.
20. See Carroll v. Pratt, 247 Minn. 198, 76 N.W.2d 693, 698 (1956).
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however, is not enough in most jurisdictions, even though ap-
parent authority is binding in most contexts other than settle-
ment.21 In some states, an exception to this rule arises when
the settlement is reached by counsel in the presence of the
court.22 The party's behavior after settlement may prove the
existence of implied actual authority of counsel to effect a binding
settlement or may establish ratification of the settlement by the
party.23 Similarly, a representative sent to a pre-trial conference
before a judge requiring such persons to be clothed with full
settlement authority, may be found, despite his or her actual
authority, to have sufficient authority to bind the party.
The party opposing a motion to enforce settlement has a
relatively simple objective-to show that no settlement was ever
reached or agreed to. That party can show this by refuting the
moving party's proof of settlement or by showing that counsel
or another agent who agreed to the settlement lacked authority
to settle.
Once settlement is established, the court will force the party
to elect a remedy, and either seek specific performance of the
terms of the settlement or reinstate the original claim.24 The
preferred route will vary according to the terms of the settle-
ment, the likelihood of success in the underlying action, the time
and expense required for trial, and the resources of the parties.
Conclusion
A motion to enforce settlement presents a powerful tool for
effecting the final resolution of an action when one party reneges
on a settlement agreement. Although it is unfortunate that resort
to such a remedy is necessary, every litigator needs to be aware
of its availability and knowledgeable in its use if needed.
21. See Ghostley v. Hetland, 295 Minn. 376, 204 N.W.2d 821, 823 (1973).
22. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 481.08 (1982).
23. See Fingerhut Mfg. Co. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 267 Minn. 201, 125 N.W.2d
734 (1964); Aetna Life & Casualty v. Anderson, 310 N.W.2d 91, 95 (Minn. 1981).
24. See Dankese v. Defense Logistics Agency, 693 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1982);
Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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